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Current advertising of "The Everything Card"' accurately describes
the modem plastic passport to purchasing which is rapidly replacing
cash. Credit cards, offspring of the credit coin first issued by department
stores in the early l900's,2 have become so widespread that today there
are 200,000,000 in use throughout the country.3 The average American
family has 3.6 charge accounts, 1.8 oil company cards, 0.5 restaurant
cards, and 0.2 national credit cards.4 Because they can purchase any-
thing from a tank of gas to an extended European vacation, it is not
surprising that credit card transactions total several billion dollars
annually.
A credit card assures merchants that the authorized holder is a good
credit risk and thereby permits rapid extension of credit without great
risk of credit losses. But the ready acceptability of these instruments
has created a new business risk-credit card fraud-which occurs when
someone obtains a card and with it purchases goods or services by mis-
representing himself as the authorized holder. Since the current prac-
tice of honoring the card without requiring additional identification of
the customer makes credit card fraud a relatively easy and safe form of
larceny,5 credit card losses are high-perhaps as high as 500 to a 100
million dollars a year.? When so much is "sold" without payment by
the actual buyer, the situation becomes a matter of public concern.
1. First National City Bank of New York's slogan for its credit card plan introduced
in the fall of 1967. Advertisement in the N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1967, at 33.
2. Rubin, Credit Cards and You, Part I, New Haven Register, Sept. 24, 1967, Sunday
Pictorial, at 6, col. 2. See Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 VAL. L. REv. 218 (1967). Credit coins were small metal discs with an engraved
number corresponding to the customer's charge account. Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa.
Dist. 778, 779 (Phil. Mun. Ct. 1915). Coins were later replaced by the familiar charge.a.
plate still used by some stores today. The operation of these early credit systems Is dis.
cussed in J. BARTLETr & C. REED, RETAIL CREDIT PRACTICE 134, 138-39 (1928).
3. Coha, Credit Card Frauds, BANKERS MONTHLY, June 15, 1967, at 24; Credit Card
Frauds: What You Need to Know About this Growing Danger, NATIONAL PEOLEIM
NEvs, March 1967, at 93.
4. Rubin, supra note 2, at 6, col. 1.
5. This casual approach to customer identification has apparently been a part of credit
cards since their inception. See J. BARTLETr & C. REED, supra note 2, at 138.39. The prac.
tice has met criticism within the credit card industry, and one credit card exectttive has
suggested that merchants require supporting identification before accepting any credit
card. Address by Hugh C. McDonald, Director of Security, Midwest Bank Card System,
in Pittsburgh, Pa., Nov. 1967, on file at the Yale Law Journal.
6. TIME, Nov. 24, 1967, at 80.
7. New Haven Register, Nov. 15, 1967, at 36, col. 4. Other estimates are: $20 million,
Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. INn. & COMe. L. RtV,
485, 487 & n.9 (1967); $30 million, Renner, Crime and the Credit Card, KiWANIS MAGAZINE,
Summer, 1966, at 20; $40 million, Maidenberg, Personal Finance: Holders of Credit Cards
Are Warned that Losing Them Can Prove Costly, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1967, at 69, col. 3;
$20-50 million, Coha, supra note 3, at 24.
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In recent years, the problem of distributing fraud losses among the
participants in the credit card enterprise-issuer, merchant, and card-
holder-has received increasing attention within the legal order s Un-
fortunately, the credit card has been approached as a variation on older
more familiar legal arrangements rather than as a significantly differ-
ent kind of commercial instrument.9 As a result, courts, legislators, and
commentators have failed to evaluate different methods of distributing
the loss in light of the goals any system of loss distribution should serve.
I. The Present System of Loss Distribution
Distribution of credit card fraud losses has generally been left to the
card issuers, who have developed various means of absorbing and shift-
ing the loss. Legal institutions have involved themselves only to enforce
these arrangements and, occasionally, to impose minimal restrictions. 0
Issuers may at first have absorbed fraud losses as part of the normal
credit risk, but they soon attempted to shift the loss to card-holders."
When early judicial authority tentatively settled on the rule that the
holder was not automatically liable unless he had specifically contracted
to bear the risk of loss,12 issuers began placing liability-shifting clauses
in the credit application or on the card itself. Initially these clauses
attempted to shift the entire risk by holding the customer liable for all
8. Since 1960 fourteen cases involving disputed credit card charges have been reported;
previously there were only seven, the earliest a 1915 case. See notes, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27 infra.
9. Commentators have made numerous comparisons between credit cards and other
commercial instruments. Letters of credit: Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Trans-
actions: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 459, 465 (1960); Note, Credit Cards, 35 Noxr
DA-mE LAw. 225, 226-28 (1960). Assignment of accounts: id. 228-29. Third-party benefi-
ciaries: id. 229-30. Exculpatory clauses; Comment, Applicability of Exculpatory Clause
Principles to Credit Card Risk-Shifting Clauses, 22 L4. L. Rav. 640 (1962). UCC transac-
tions: Bergensten, supra note 7 at 502-04; Davenport, supra note 2.
Most of these discussions admitted that the analogies are imperfect. Others suggested
that comparisons should not obscure the unique features of the card. See Bergsten, supra
note 7, at 503-04; Comment, The Lost Credit Card: The Liability of the Parties, 80 AL-
BANY L. REv. 79, 87 (1966); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 270 (1960).
10. See pp. 1421-23 infra.
11. The earliest report of such an attempt is Wanasnaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778
(Phil. Mun. Ct. 1915). In that case a store successfully recovered $61.10 from a customer
whose lost credit coin had been used to purchase goods. Although the coin bore nothing
but an identifying number, the court held it was "in effect an order upon the [store]
to deliver goods to the person presenting it, and to charge the said goods to the [holder's]
account. It [was] similar to a check, a bill of exchange, or other negotiable instrument
payable to bearer." Id. at 779.
This holding was criticized in Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 NJ.L. 658, 660. 121 A. 131, 143
(Sup. Ct. 1923), and rejected in Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P., Lan-
caster County 1935).
12. Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 659-60, 121 A. 131 (Sup. CL 1923); ef. Jones Store
Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S•W.2d 681 (1931); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa.
D. & C. 147 (C.P. Lancaster County 1935); John Wanamaker v. Chase, 81 Pa. Super. 201,
205 (1923).
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purchases until the card was surrendered to the issuer.18 Perhaps fear-
ing judicial hostility to this scheme,' 4 issuers changed to the now cus-
tomary provision that makes the cardholder liable until he surrenders
the card or gives the issuer written notice that it is lost or stolen.'6
The liability-until-notice clause was apparently invented by oil com-
panies, the first businesses to issue cards on a massive scale, but it soon
became standard throughout the credit card industry.16 Although some
plans operate without the clause,11 its simplicity and apparent effec-
tiveness in shifting liability has led most issuers to adopt some variation
of the scheme. Since liability-until-notice clauses do not relieve the is-
suer of the risk that some fraudulent purchases will be made after
notice is received, many issuers compile periodic lists of missing cards
and warn merchants not to accept them. In systems where one card is
honored by numerous independent businesses, 8 an issuer may require
that the merchant assume liability if he honors any card appearing on
the current stop list.1
II. Legal Reaction to Liability-Until-Notice
Although liability-until-notice clauses are extremely common, legal
authority on their validity is scarce. Only five courts in three jurisdic-
13. "The named holder shall be responsible for all purchases made by use of this
card, prior to its surrender to the issuing company, whether or not such purchases are
made by the named holder. Magnolia Products Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881
(rex. Civ. App. 1948).
14. Quite probably courts would find a total shift of risk unreasonable, especially If
the holder notified the issuer of the loss. After he has sent notice, the holder can do
nothing to prevent loss, while the issuer can. Direct evidence of judicial opposition to a
complete shift does not exist, but the court in Magnolia Products Co. v. McMillan, 168
S.W.2d 881, 882 (rex. Civ. App. 1943), implied that notice of loss might have relieved
a cardholder of liability under a surrender clause.
15. A typical liability clause is that of Humble Oil & Refining Co.: "[Customer n'uned
hereon ... assumes responsibility for purchases made through its use prior to Its Sur.
render to Humble, or prior to the receipt by Humble of written notice of its loss or
theft."
16. See generally Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-13uslness Run
by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. ktv. 1001, 1089,98
(1966).
17. E.g., the credit card system considered in Thomas v. Central Charge Service, Inc.,
212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965). In the absence of any liability clause, the court held
that a duty of due care could be implied. Without stating why, it further held that the
holder's negligence would not by itself justify recovery by the issuer. Id. at 534.
18. E.g., American Express, Diners' Club. Such systems have been dubbed "tripartite"
credit cards. See generally Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transacllots: A Legal
Infant, 48 CAiF. L. REV. 459 (1960).
19. In some systems the issuer-merchant contract provides that the merchant Is liable
if he accepts a card which appears on the current stop list. Bergsten, supra note 7, at 503.
In others, the stop list itself has provisions shifting liability. See Bulletin No, 10-1967,
Humble Oil & Refining Co., Nov. 20, 1967 (on file with the Yale Law Journal). The
merchant's liability may extend only to sales over a certain amount. In oill company
systems, the merchant is liable only on sales of more than five or ten dollars, roughly the
cost of a tank of gas. Id.
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tions have confronted the issue,2 0 and their decisions are in conflict.
Two cases, both decided in New York, went for the issuer on the
grounds that contracts should be enforced to the letter;2 ' one of the
judges followed the language of a "liability-until-written-notice" clause
so closely that he held that the cardholder's liability did not end when
she notified the issuer by phone.2 A third New York court employed
equally strict standards of construction to rule the clause inapplicable
where the cardholder was unaware that her card was missing. 3 Absent
any agreement by the parties on who was liable under those circum-
stances, the court reasoned, each owed the other a duty of due care24
and the issuer's negligence precluded his recovery.25
In two remaining jurisdictions-Oregon and California-courts
20. There are sixteen other reported cases involving credit cards, but none consider
the validity of liability-until-notice clauses. In six of the reported cases there was no
liability-shifting clause: Thomas v. Central Charge Service, Inc., 212 A.2d 533 (D.C. CL
App. 1965); Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 SAV.2d 631 (1931); Lit Bros.
v. Haines, 98 NJ.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923); John Wanamaker -. Chase, 81 Pa.
Super. 201 (1923); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P., Lancaster County
1935); Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phil. Mun. Ct. 1915). Two cases involved
liability-until-surrender clauses: Gulf Ref. Co. v, Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186
S.W.2d 790 (1945); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 SAV.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943). In three cases only the effect of notice by a holder that he would no longer be re-
sponsible for his wife's purchases was in issue: Nieman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 So.2d 762
(La. Ct. App. 1962); Socony Mobile Oil Co. v. Greif, 10 App. Div. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S.2d 522
(1960); Abraham & Straus v. Teller, 37 Misc. 2d 797, 236 N.Y.S2d 435 (1962. Two cases
concerned situations where the defendant cardholder never received the card involved:
Humble Oil S- Ref. Co. v. Waters, 159 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Uni-Serv. Corp. v.
Frede, 50 Misc. 2d 823, 271 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966). Agency considerations were
the decisive issues in two other cases: Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Consoldated Van Lines &
Storage Co., 192 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ga. 1960) (joint venturers); Kante v. Standard Oil Co.,
108 Ga. App. 602, 133 S.E.2d 913 (1963) (employee). The final case, Read v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
114 Ga. App. 21, 150 S.E.2d 319 (1965), ostensibly involved a simple factual dispute over
notice. The opinion does not discuss what appears to have been the real issue--that the
holder had notified the issuer to cancel one of two cards she held, but mistakenly identified
the wrong one. Bergsten, supra note 7, at 493 n.36.
21. Uni Serv Corp. v. Vitiello, 53 Misc. 2d 396, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Civ. CL 1967)
(Berry, J.); Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962),
aff'd mem. 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
22. The holder phoned the issuer immediately upon discovering the loss, but delayed
sending written notice for a few days. During this interval most of the $635 of fraud
involved occurred. In holding that verbal notice did not relieve the holder of liability, the
court remarked that it was "unfortunate that defendant did not immediately send a
telegram to plaintiff advising it of the loss .... " Uni Serv v. Vitlello, 53 Misc. 2d 396,
399, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969, 973 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (Berry, J.).
23. " T]he credit agreement ... does not expressly provide that the holder assumes all
risk occasioned by loss or theft of the credit card where the credit cardholder is unaware
of such facts and thus is unable to give the required notice." Allied Stores v. Funderburke,
52 Misc. 2d 872, 875, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11-12 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (Birns, J.) (emphasis added).
The clause involved was: "To pay for all purchases made by any person presenting the
identification plate which Seller will lend me, until Seller receives my notice by certified
mail that same has been lost or stolen." Id. at 873, 277 N.Y.S.2d 10.
24. Id. at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 16.
25. Allied Stores issued a card for use only in its stores. Whenever the outstanding
credit balance exceeded $200, an automatic "spillout" was to occur. In this case 237
forgeries, totaling $2,460, occurred over a 30-day period without the store taking any
action. Id. at 878, 277 N.Y.S.2d 14-15.
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have read the liability-until-notice clause in such a way that the issuer
has a duty of due care irrespective of the card-holder's conduct. Union
Oil Co. v. Lull,26 the leading case,27 held that a credit cardholder was
essentially a gratuitous indemnitor and could expect the issuer "to
exercise reasonable diligence to protect [him] in transactions which
[might] create indemnity liability. '28 Regardless of the holder's own
negligence, the issuer could recover "only if due care [was] exercised...
to ascertain the authority of the customer who present[ed] the card.""
While conceding that standard liability-shifting clauses could in theory
place the risk of fraud loss on the cardholder, these holdings effectively
keep the risk on the issuer. He can recover only after proving that he
or his agents have taken care to prevent fraud. 0 Store clerks, gas station
attendants and ticket agents are unlikely to remember one specific sale
in enough detail to convince a jury that they were careful, and present
identification practices are too casual to support an inference that due
care is usually exercised. To shift liability under the Union Oil rule,
card issuers would have to adopt precautions that would substantially
eliminate any chance of fraud.
Three state legislatures which have considered civil liability for
credit card fraud have taken different courses. A New York law requires
that liability clauses be printed in eight point bold type3l and prohibits
holder liability after notice of loss has been sent. 2 This statute, as well
as those enacted in Illinois33 and Wisconsin,34 further provides that a
cardholder is not bound by the liability clause unless he has requested
the card or used it after it is received.3 While New York and Wiscon-
sin leave the basic structure of liability-until-notice untouched, Illinois
fundamentally altered the system. The Illinois statute limits cardholder
liability under any scheme to $75-$25 if the card does not have a signa-
26. 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
27. The holding was followed in Diner's Club v. Whited, Civil No. A 10872 (L.A. Super.
Ct. App. Dep't, Aug. 6, 1964), reported and noted in 43 N.C.L. RiLv. 416 (1965), 67 W. VA.
L. REv. 145 (1965).
28. 220 Ore. at 427, 349 P.2d 250.
29. Id. at 433, 349 P.2d 252.
30. Union Oil held that this was a jury question with the burden of proof on the issuer.
220 Ore. 412, 434, 436, 349 P.2d 243, 253-54 (1960).
31. This footnote is printed in eight point bold.
32. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 512 (McKinney 1968).
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 381 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
34. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.45 (1967 West's Wis. Leg. 5er., at 560).
35. These provisions were all enacted in 1967. [1967] New York Sess. Laws, c. 753
(McKinney); 119 67] ill. Laws - (Hist. Note, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 381 (Smitl.
Hurd, Supp. 1967)); West's Wis. Leg. Serv. ch. 155, § 1 (1967). Prior to their passage,
commentators had suggested that common law principles would require the same result,
See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 2, at 223 n.21; Comment, supra note 18, 48 CALIF. L. REv.
459, 480-81 (1960).
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ture panel.36 This provision not only burdens the issuer with most of
the risk of fraud loss, but also encourages the use of a safety device that
the legislature obviously favored.
3 7
The legal status of liability-until-notice is thus somewhat unclear at
present, in large part because courts vary in their willingness to rewrite
contracts. What judicial victories cardholders have won owe much to
the fact that contract terms are drawn solely by the issuer; the customer
cannot bargain for some other arrangement, he can only refuse to take
the card. Since the clauses are not the result of bilateral agreement, but
rather of unilateral commercial law-making, courts as well as legisla-
tures should regard themselves free to modify the system in the interest
of public and private economic welfare. 8 Once these factors are con-
sidered, the result reached in Oregon and minois-issuer liability-is
clearly the right one.
III. The Economics of Cardholder vs. Issuer Liability
In evaluating any system of loss distribution, three criteria should
rule: does the system operate so that the loss is reduced to an economic
minimum, does it spread the costs of the loss, and does it accomplish
both of these functions without unnecessary administrative expenseFO
No system, like cardholder liability, placing the initial risk of loss on
a participant who lacks information about the size and nature of the
loss and full control over the mechanics of distribution can satisfy these
criteria. Issuer liability, on the other hand, achieves optimal results
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 382 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1967).
37. A legislative incentive for the use of signed cards, as opposed to the unsigned type
common in the gasoline industry, may not be economically desirable. See note 51 infra.
38. In Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein the court considered the economic consequences of its
decision: "'With the increasing use of the credit card and its growing importance to the
economy, the imposition of a high duty of diligence upon the major oil companies in
general, most of whom use the same or similar systems of credit card transactions, would
result in an impairment of an important segment of our economic structure. 34 Misc. 2d
751, 754, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51, 55 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962), aff'd mem., 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d
495 (Sup. Ct. 1963)."
While the court erred in its understanding of the economics of issuer liability, it
correctly gave attention to this factor. Regulation of the economic welfare is generally the
province of the legislature, but courts often invalidate unilaterally drafted contractual pro-
visions which are against public policy. See Macaulay, supra note 16, at 1062-63. Contracts-
of-adhesion doctrine provides one rationale for judicial intervention. Note 70 infra.,
39. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Rish Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum
and Kalven, 75 YAU L.J. 216 (1965). An additional, and non-economic criterion-does the
system allocate loss fairly?-adds little where the loss, like credit card fraud, is not so
much the fault of individual participants as an inevitable cost of maintaining the system.
See p. 1425 infra. Spreading the cost among all participants is then the fairest alloca-
tion that can be made.
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because two necessary elements-information and control-coalesce in
the risk-bearer.
A. Loss minimization
A system of loss distribution that does not minimize losses--:e.,
operate so that the marginal cost of prevention equals the marginal
savings of loss reduction-misallocates resources. Either excess loss or
excess precaution represents an unnecessary inefficiency.
Economic loss minimization works in two ways. First, participants
who bear the loss will take steps to prevent it until the cost to them of
further prevention would exceed the consequent reductions in their
loss. At any position other than equalization, it would be cheaper to
bear more loss by foregoing relatively expensive preventive activity, or
to bear less loss by taking relatively inexpensive precautions. Second,
some who might participate will decide not to bear even the reduced
cost of loss and stay out of the system. Of course, as losses are mini-
mized, more people come into the system; increased participation in
turn increases fraud loss and drives some of the participants out again.
The cycle continues until it reaches equilibrium, at which point
further changes have no advantage for anyone within or without the
system.
Clearly, the key to efficient loss minimization is information about
loss costs. Unless the party with the risk is aware of the cost of bearing
and preventing loss, he cannot correctly judge how to minimize loss.
While many, if not most, cardholders are aware of their potential
liability,40 none are able to predict accurately the probability or magni-
tude of any fraud loss they might incur. From their viewpoint, the
costs of fraud loss are unknowable, and without knowledge of these
costs they cannot minimize their losses.
Moreover, even if accurate cost information were available to them,
card users have little control over the system. Liability-shifting clauses
are so widespread that customers can only decide whether to use credit
cards or not. Although some persons, probably as a result of publicity
on liability-until-notice, 41 do decide to opt out of the system, 42 this is
40. See Bergsten, supra note 7, at 500; Macaulay, supra note 16, at 1099.1101,
41. E.g., The Built-in Cost of Credit Cards, 24 CONSUMER RrxORS 140, 143 (1959);
Lirr, June 1, 1959, at 120; Tibm, Nov. 24, 1967, at 80; N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1967, at 6A,
col. I Cardholders also learned of the danger in liability-until-notice from publicity by
issuers of limited liability cards, see p. 1480 infra, and credit card insurance, see p. 1427
inlra. Macaulay, supra note 16, at 1104-06, 1115.
42. NATIONAL PE-roLauA Navs, April 1967, at 107.
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at best a crude form of loss minimization-if it does achieve optimal
loss levels, the result will be due more to the laws of chance than of
economics. Once a person decides to use cards he can take some rela-
tively inexpensive steps to prevent fraud," 4 but these are probably far
less efficient than changes in the card itself. 44
The issuer, on the other hand, can minimize losses well. Because he
handles a large volume of credit transactions over a long period of
time, the issuer is able to determine precisely the cost of credit card
fraud. Because he controls the design of the card and the system of
identification, he can also minimize losses by deciding whether to take
any preventive steps-such as using pictures,45 code devices, 0 or the
holder's voice prin 7 as an integral part of the card. Having the easiest
access to information and greatest control, the issuer is the best party
to minimize losses.
As long as issuers can recover fraudulent charges from cardholders
without driving too many out of the system, however, they have little
incentive to use their information and control to minimize fraud loss.
Since cardholders cannot predict losses and do not expect to lose cards,
they probably underestimate the risk of fraud. If this is the case-and
the popularity of liability-until-notice among issuers suggests that it
is-then possible liability deters few people from using credit cards,
and issuers profit more by shifting the risk than by bearing and
minimizing itL48
43. E.g., periodic checks to discover lost cards and the preparation of post cards giving
notice of loss which could be sent immediately upon discovery. See Macaulay supra note 16,
at 1108.
44. See text infra.
45. Bergsten, supra note 7, at 506. Most credit cards now in use contain at most the
holder's account number, name, address, and signature. Oil company cards have even
less information-usually only an account number and name.
46. One suggested device is a magnetic sheet which has a code knom only to the
holder. When this sheet is inserted in a special machine and the customer gives the
correct code, a green signal appears. If an incorrect code is given, a red light appears.
Coha, supra note 3, at 26-27.
47. A voice print of the holder speaking his name or social security number is
laminated into the card. When the customer presents the card, it Is inserted into a
machine which compares the print with the customer's voice. This vould virtually
eliminate the possibility of fraud. See Livingston, Banhing's Role in a Credit Card
Economy, BAuNGmr, Sept. 1966, at 111, 112.
48. For example, consider a credit card system with an annual fraud loss of $10,000 and
ten thousand cardholders. Shifting this loss onto the holders in effect puts a $1 price tag
on each card-provided the cardholders are fully aware of the risk. If the issuer could
eliminate all fraud by installing a safety system costing $5,000 a year, he would do so,
thereby reducing the "price" of a card to fifty cents and gaining more card users.
However, to the extent that they do not see the costs of fraud, cardholders will under-
estimate the price of a card. From their limited perspective, the cost of fraud may appear
to be only $1,000 a year, or ten cents a card. Issuer liability in such a case would effectively
cost the issuer $4,000 more than holder liability; by taking the risk of fraud on himself
and attempting to reduce it he would actually lose business.
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Of course, some issuers will absorb small pre-notice losses rather than
lose a good customer or incur higher costs of collection. Apparently,
however, a number of issuers dun cardholders for almost all losses and
frequently succeed in getting payment. 49 Moreover, the reported cases
indicate that fraudulent purchases can add up to thousands of dollars
before notice is given, 0 and when the loss is large issuers are likely to
invoke the clause. Consequently, cardholders bear enough loss--in
practice as well as in theory-to reduce substantially the pressures on
issuers to minimize.
While liability-until-notice may encourage careful use of cards and
prompt reporting of their loss and theft, its worth here is questionable,
especially when balanced against its anti-minimization effects. Credit
cards are generally kept in wallets or pocketbooks, with cash and other
valuable papers; it is doubtful whether liability-until-notice increases
the care with which cardholders guard these. To the extent that liabil-
ity results in prompt reporting of missing cards, limited liability would
seem as effective as unlimited. The Illinois statute, for example, pro-
vides an incentive for speedy notice without seriously inhibiting the
processes of loss minimization. A twenty-five dollar ceiling on card-
holder liability is probably sufficient for the purpose and should be
the maximum for all cards, signed or unsigned.5 1
B. Spreading
Cardholder liability is also unsatisfactory because it lumps the loss on
a few individuals.52 If only the affluent used credit cards, this problem
49. Apparently about half of the issuers try to recover and are successful in 30 to 50
per cent of their attempts. Interview with managers of a local bank credit card plan, In
New Haven, Nov. 16, 1967; Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study Study of the Unauthorized
Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MiAm L. REv. 811, 833-34 (1967).
50. The amounts involved in the cases are: $2,619.72, Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Waters,
159 So. 2d 408, 409 (La. Ct. App. 1963); $2,460, Allied Stores v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d
872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (Birns, J.); $1,622.99, Diners' Club, Inc. v.
Whited, Civil No. A 10872, (LA. Super. Ct. App. Dep't, Aug. 6, 1964), reported at 43
N.C.L. REv. 416, 417 (1965); $1,454.25, Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 418, 349 P.2d
243, 246 (1960); $975.84, Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co,, 208 Ark, 362, 363, 186
S.W.2d 790, 792 (1945); $685.41, Uni Serv Corp. v. Vitiello, 53 Misc. 2d 396, 397, 278
N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (Berry, J.); $596.98, Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstelh, 34
Misc. 2d 751, 753, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962), aff'd mene. 39 Misc. 2d 552,
241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1963); more than $500, Thomas v. Central Charge Service, Inc.,
212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965); $431.64, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. MeMillan, 168
S.W.2d 881 (rex. Civ. App. 1943); $173.88, Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D, & C. 147
(C.P., Lancaster County 1935); $61.10, Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist, 778 (Phil. Mun,
Ct. 1915).
51. Once the bulk of fraud loss is placed on the issuer, it Is unnecessary to encourage
the use of signed cards. If the costs of such cards are less than the loss they prevent, issuers
will use them; if they are more expensive, they should not be used. The Illinois incentive
for signed cards is thus undesirable: it creates a false incentive and may work against the
desired goal-reduction of fraud-by decreasing minimization pressures on the issuer.
52. The same considerations which made medicare and social insurance attractive
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might not be of great concern. Today, however, cards are issued by
large retail stores and discount houses13 whose middle and lower-middle
income clientele may find sudden liability a severe economic hard-
ship. Issuer liability automatically accomplishes a considerable degree
of spreading, because the issuer will pass on the losses in increased
prices. Even if the issuer elected to absorb the loss himself, by taking
a reduced profit, he would face little danger of unbearable loss since
fraud losses average less than one per cent of total sales."
C. Administrative costs
In an attempt to spread their own risk, some cardholders presently re-
sort to liability insurance. The administrative costs involved in provid-
ing this independent insurance are significantly greater than they
would be if issuers financed equivalent insurance for cardholders
through periodic charges. Insurance against fraudulent purchases is
available today at rates ranging from $2.65 a year for $1,000 protection
up to $8.00 for $10,000 coverage. 5 Were the issuer to absorb all losses,
post-notice as well as pre-notice, the cost would average $0.25 per credit
card per year. 6 Assuming the average family has six cards,"I an issuer-
run insurance scheme would cost little more than $1.50 per family per
year, a reduction of 40 per cent over the present cost.rs The nature of
the insurance industry partially explains the drastic difference in insur-
ance costs. Present rates are based upon rough guesses and information
provided by issuers and are necessarily set a little high to provide a
margin of error. Even if insurance companies could calculate the risk
apply to credit cards. In each case the secondary economic effects of a "50 loss borne by
one individual are more disruptive than those of a $1 loss borne by 50 people.
53. E.g., Sears Roebuck & Co. and Caldor.
54. Coha, supra note 3, at 24; Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs of the House Banking and Currency Committee, 90th Cong., 1st Ses.,
pt. 1, at 262 (1967). See generally Murray, supra note 49. Although one per cent may not
be insignificant for an issuer on a ten per cent profit margin, such loss is still far less
destructive than a $1,500 loss to the average American family. See p. 1426 & note 50 supra.
55. Maidenberg, supra note 7, at 72, col. 3. Credit card insurance first appeared in
1964 at a rate of $2.00 anually for $500 coverage. NATto.AL UNDEswrrE, Aug. 28, 1964,
at 8. Later that year a policy with $1,000 coverage was available for $6.00 a year. Id.,
Sept. 4, 1964, at 27.
56. This figure is based on an estimated $50,000,000 annual loss, see Tssm, Nov. 24,
1967, at 80, and a total credit card population of 200,000,000. See authorities cited note 3
supra.
57. See note 4 supra. It is assumed that all these cards are the type which generate
credit card fraud.
58. These comparisons do not fully reflect the savings of an issuer-run system. As the
cases demonstrate, $1,000 coverage would not dispose of all potential risk, supra note 50,
and complete protection would therefore cost more than $2.60 a year. Moreover, liability
insurance spreads only the costs of pre-notice fraud, while the proposed scheme spreads
the entire loss. Thus a true comparison of issuer and independent insurance plans would
show savings under the issuer plan much greater than 40 per cent.
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as precisely as the issuer, their rates would be higher to reflect the ad-
ministrative costs of drafting the policy, selling insurance, and han-
dling claims. All of these costs are reduced, if not eliminated, when the
issuer himself becomes the insurer.
Commercial insurance not only reflects additional administrative
costs, it may reduce pressures to minimize fraud losses. If the costs of
credit card fraud are disguised so that they are indistinguishable from
other costs of living, none of the parties will minimize loss. Insurance
spokesmen have suggested that clauses covering credit card liability be
written as a standard part of homeowner's insurance.69 This would
hide the costs of fraud among other insured costs of homeownership,
and the decision whether or not to use credit cards would then be
cost-free.60
The same factors which make the issuer the best loss-avoider, then,
make him the cheapest insurer. If cardholders knew as much and could
insure as cheaply as issuers, it would not matter who bore the initial
risk. Absent such equality, issuer liability is necessarily the most ef-
ficient means of insuring credit card fraud losses.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
The reduction of administrative costs is itself sufficient reason to
favor issuer liability. When the effects on loss minimization and spread-
ing are added, the case becomes compelling. Ideally, card issuers should
voluntarily assume liability for fraud losses, passing them on to card-
holders through periodic service charges. Such a system would repre.
sent a threefold improvement over the now-prevalent liability-until-
notice. First, the issuer would then treat fraud as an operating cost, and
would accordingly be under economic pressure to adjust the system
and minimize losses. 1 Second, if losses in each system were reflected in
59. NATIONAL UNDERwRITER, Nov. 13, 1964, at 18.
60, Credit card insurance in every homeowner's policy would not only disguise fraud
costs, it would result in externalization. Insured homeowners who did not use credit cards
would pay as much as those who did, and pressures to minimize losses would be accord-
ingly reduced. Credit card insurance also produces externalization because present
policies cover an unlimited number of cards and have the same premium regardless of
how many are owned. Holders of low-risk cards and those with only one or two bear part
of the cost of cardholders whose participation actually causes a greater share of the loss.
As with social insurance, such spreading reduces loss-minimization pressures, See Calabresi,
Wonderful World, supra note 39, at 219-22,
61. Of course, after the issuer has determined what precautions most efficiently mini-
mize losses, he will still need some method of enforcing them. All present suggestions for
sophisticated anti-fraud devices may in fact cost more than they save. In that case issuers
would retain the present stop-list-of-stolen-cards approach. Limited liability-until-notice
and merchant liability for purchases on stopped cards would be adequate enforcement
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the cost of using the card, potential holders would be able to make
economically enlightened choices about using cards. 2 Third, card-
holder-financed issuer-liability would achieve maximum spreading
without incurring unnecessary administrative costs.w
Card issuers are likely to resist the changes on three grounds, none
very sound. The first objection is that customers will not use cards un-
less they can obtain them at no cost. Such fear overlooks potential
holders who presently refuse to use cards because of unlimited liability;
these lost souls may well outnumber those who would refuse to pay a
quarter a year for a credit card. A second objection is that issuer liabil-
ity will impair the ready acceptability of credit cards-the prime
reason for their popularity. More strict or complicated identification
procedures, it is argued, will discourage cardholders and merchants.
Even if true, this only indicates that such procedures are not eco-
nomical-i.e., that cardholders would be willing to pay for more fraud
in order to have a more casual credit plan.(- A third objection argues
that where the issuer and merchant are one, issuer liability will result
in credit cards being no more useful than the personal check they were
devices. If an identification device were selected, reporting of lost cards would not be
necessary, but issuers would need some means of encouraging merchants to use the device,
possibly merchant liability for fraudulent purchases made when the machine is not used.
Automatic policing would be possible with a device that not only checked identification
but also marked the charge slip to indicate that the check was made.
62. Costs of each card would reflect its safety. Cards which give identification and
those which purchase expensive goods and services would probably cost more than cards
whose purchasing power is limited and those which include safety features. In one bank
card system with losses of $1,000 annually and 120,000 cards, the cost would be less than
one cent a year. Interview with local bank card system managers, Neur Haven, Nov. 16,
1967. Periodic service charges are also preferable to passing fraud costs on to merchants
and ultimately consumers through increased prices. Issuer-merchant contracts commonly
prohibit price discrimination between cash and credit card customers and thus the costs
of credit card fraud would be externalized to cash customers. See First National Bank of
New Haven Issuer-Merchant contract on file with the Yale Law Journal. In a perfect
economic world, cash customers would readily shift to any competitive stores which did
not use credit cards and therefore had lower prices; eventually there would be no
externalization. However, in the imperfect real world such shifts might not occur. The
increase in costs is likely to be minimal and easily offset by such considerations as cus-
tomer loyalty and convenience.
Financing through higher prices also disguises the costs of any particular system among
all those credit plans used by a single merchant. If these costs are lumped together, card-
holders cannot intelligently choose among various plans and there may be excessive use
of the more costly systems.
63. Of course maximum spreading of any loss is achieved through general social
insurance. Such schemes are undesirable, however, because they eliminate all los.minumiza.
rion pressures. See Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 89, at 219-22.
64. Issuers will obviously employ whatever system most satisfies consumers and this
may mean higher fraud costs and less strict identification procedures. For similar reasons
some cardholders may prefer a system of liability.until.notice, despite the accompanying
risk. Government can legitimately prohibit the market from making this latter decision
to protect those consumers who would take the risk unwittingly and to insure adequate
spreading. Issuer liability eliminates the problem of the uninsured cardholder just as
compulsory uninsured motorist provisions eliminate the uninsured driver.
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designed to replace. This argument misconceives the barrier to ready
acceptance of personal checks.
Checks are difficult to cash, not primarily because of fear of forgery,
but because of the uncertainty of the drawer's credit. A comparison
between the difficulties of cashing a personal check and the ease of
cashing traveler's checks illustrates the point. As with a forged check,
a merchant who accepts a forged traveler's check bears the loss if the
bank refuses to make payment.05 The major difference between the
two instruments is that a personal check is secured only by the credit
of the drawer, while a traveler's check is secured by the credit of the
issuing bank.66 Since credit cards are not issued except to good credit
risks, they, like traveler's checks, would remain negotiable even when
the merchant bore the risk of forgery.
The experience of American Express, one of the largest card issuers,
suggests that voluntary change might be forthcoming. In 1965 that
company limited cardholder liability to a maximum of $100 even when
notice is never given.67 Part of the annual service charge for this cardo5
is in effect a premium on a compulsory liability insurance policy with
a conditional deductibility clause. Unless and until issuers redesign the
system, however, courts will increasingly be asked to enforce liability-
until-notice clauses.69 While courts do not have a duty to rearrange all
contracts in light of economic welfare, precedents exist for invalidating
unilateral arrangements such as these.70 Without going this far, the
65. J. OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, § 275 (5th ed. 1947); cf. Samberg v. American
Express Co., 136 Mich. 639 (1904). See also Sullivan v. Knauth, 220 N.Y. 216, 223 (1917?.
66. Traveler's checks are instruments drawn by a bank upon itself, but not negot able
until countersigned by the original purchaser. 10 Ax. JnR. 2d Banks § 546 (1963).
67. Macaulay, supra note 16, at 1093 & n.105; Bergsten, supra note 7, at 504; application
for American Express credit card, on file with the Yale Law Journal. Shortly after
American Express introduced this system, Diners' Club made the same change. Macaulay,
supra at 1093.
68. Twelve dollars. American Express credit card application on file with the Yale
Law Journal.
69. At first glance it is difficult to see why issuers do not change voluntarily. One reason
is that as long as cardholders underestimate the risk, it is cheaper to shift losses than to
absorb them. See p. 1425 & note 48 supra. A second reason stems from the nature of In.
surance. Even if issuers could convince potential cardholders that issuer liability and
periodic service charges were cheaper than holder liability and private insurance, many
holders would still prefer to risk a possible loss rather than pay a small but definite charge.
This tendency is especially strong when the risk of loss is as small as it is here.
Issuers then will not change as long as consumers underestimate the cost or gamble on
escaping all loss. In the long run self-correction is only a strong possibility and in the
short run a remote one. Since the economic evil in the present situation is clear, there is
no reason why courts and legislatures should wait for consumers to become aware of the
costs; such delay only perpetuates the misallocation of resources.
70. For example, contracts of adhesion doctrine easily fits liability-until-notice. All four
elements of such a contract are present in the system: (1) the clause is a standardized
contract provision; (2) the card is unavailable without the clause; (3) the credit card is
to some degree a necessity-at least as necessary now as personal checks; and (4) the
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judiciary could further the desired goals by adopting a rule like that
in Union Oil. Yet the ultimate effectiveness of judicial solution is
doubtful. Even if courts denied such clauses legal effect, issuers might
retain them, trusting that the average citizen's lack of legal knowledge
and reluctance to be sued would enable them to recover out of court3'
Legislative action may be required before a general change can occur.
Since the problem is nationwide and since many cards are used in
numerous jurisdictions, a uniform national policy is desirable. Two al-
ternatives are open. The first is federal legislation. Presently Congress is
considering legislation to prohibit the distribution of unsolicited credit
cards.72 It would be easy to broaden the scope of these bills and prohibit
or limit cardholder liability. The second avenue is through the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws who are now preparing a Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. This code is concerned with credit abuses and
consumer welfare, and a section covering credit card fraud loss would
be a natural addition."
If any state legislative action is taken unilaterally, it should be framed
around the Illinois model. New laws should permit only minimal card-
holder liability to encourage reporting of card losses. Legislative incen-
tives for safe card systems are unnecessary, for once the issuer is forced
to consider fraud losses as an operating cost, he will adopt the safest
and most economical system without additional prodding.
liability-until-notice dause adversely affects public welfare. See Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLu.t. L. REv,. 629 (1943);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
The harmful effect on public welfare is in fact twofold. First, the liability.until-notice
system results in a misallocation of resources. Secondly, it fails to encourage adequate
precautions against fraud by issuers and merchants, thereby facilitating criminal acts.
71. Empirical evidence suggests that issuers do seek recovery without resorting to
litigation, and that they succeed in 30-50 per cent of these informal attempts. Murray,
supra note 49, at 833-34. Even if such clauses were unenforceable, issuers would still have
considerable success with customers who would pay without legal compulsion. This
situation would be similar to the practice of some public service enterprises which insert
disclaimers of liability in tickets even though they are unenforceable. See F. HAraEL &
F. JA-ms, TORTS § 21.6 (1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 67 (1964).
72. One bill would prohibit the mailing of any unsolicited credit card: S. 2793, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Another would prohibit federal reserve member banks from issuing
unsolicited cards: H.R. 12646, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Hearings have been held on the
House bill by the Committee on Banking and Currency, beginning Nov. 8, 1967. [1967-63]
CCH Cong. Index 5593.
73. The present draft of the Code regulates credit card interest rates and services and
requires their clear disclosure, but does not cover liability-until.notice. See Uzoronu
CONSUMER CaMnr CODE §§ 1.301(6), 2.102, 2.104 & Comments, 3.102, 3.104, 3.106(3) (Working
Draft No. 6, 1967). (This draft has not been passed upon by the Commissioners.)
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